The immutability of the blockchain technology facilitates it to establish a general consensus in a trustless environment, enabling a wide range of new applications, including distributed general-purpose data management and digital data sharing marketplace. This immutability, however, presents disadvantages for the blockchain technology, when it is used in other areas where the modification of data in blockchain is demanded. In this study, we propose a method for building modifiable blockchains in decentralized public network. To be specific, in computing the hash value of the block, the proposed method uses truncated hash values (these are called 'target values' in this paper) of the transactions that are modifiable upon future requests, instead of transactions themselves. By doing so, the proposed method provides an opportunity to modify those transactions by making truncated hash values of modified versions equal to their original target values. The proposed method uses several cryptographic techniques to prevent the modification of the transaction from being performed for malicious purposes, and a multichain structure to improve the efficiency in transaction modification. By accommodating the modification feature to the blockchain, proposed architecture complies to key demands of the data protection regulations such as 'right to rectification', 'right to withdraw consent', and 'right to be forgotten', et cetera. In addition, detailed threat analysis demonstrates that the proposed truncated hash-based modification is sufficiently secure to open up a wide range of new blockchain based services through added modifiability feature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the blockchain technology has been introduced in Bitcoin [1] , it has evolved and found its way into many applications beyond cryptocurrencies. In simple terms, blockchain is a chain of blocks, where blocks consist of record keeping data of all transactions ever issued and links between blocks are implemented by hash pointers. By using hash pointers as links, the blockchain technology has the tamper-proofness and the irreversibility. These properties provide greater transparency, enhanced security, and improved traceability in data recorded in a blockchain. Combined with the incentivization by the reward system for the block computation, they can establish a general consensus in a trustless environment, enabling a wide range of new applications [2] - [11] . International Data Corporation (IDC) stated that blockchain The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Shenghong Li. technology spending will reach 2.9 billion USD in 2019 and 12.4 billion USD by 2022 [12] .
The tamper-proofness and the irreversibility of blockchain, however, present disadvantages in some service areas. For instance, it is often asserted that in order for the blockchain technology to be embraced in the financial service sector, first and foremost, the blockchain itself must be modifiable. Such a claim is also heard in various other areas, including cloud services [3] , [13] .
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION
Existing issues that motivate this study on modifiable blockchains are as follows:
(e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum) are incompatible with aforesaid demands as, once the personally identifiable information (PII) is stored in blockchain, deletion is impossible. Likewise, regulations like the United States Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) 2000, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Act on Protection of Personal Information (APPI) and the Federal Law on Data Protection (FLDP), et cetera also require on-demand removal of a block data [16] - [18] .
• Social governance: Blockchain technology is being used beyond cryptocurrency, so monetary transaction is not the only data that are stored in a block [11] , [19] - [21] . As blockchain often allows transactions to be recorded in the block without censoring them, it might lead to unwanted addition of information in blockchain. This might include child pornography, unlawful financial transaction, leaked security keys and unwanted image, private audio clip, et cetera [22] . Although the storing of such data are illegal, the immutability of blockchain prohibits the legal bodies to get rid of those illegal contents.
• Attack refinement: Vulnerability in a smart contract and distributed autonomous organization is nothing new [23] , [24] . Ironically, the abnormal situation could be solved only by a hard fork (a change to the blockchain protocol that makes previously invalid blocks or transactions valid and vice versa) as the Ethereum blockchain 1.0 was unable to patch code [25] .
• Slow adoption: Since identifying a malicious transaction is not possible before adding into the existing public chain, illicit data become public knowledge. Therefore, the user who are against this illegal use of blockchain mostly avoid adopting the entire technology [19] , [20] .
B. KEY CONTRIBUTIONS
This study aims to overcome the limitations of immutable blockchain and explore the idea of building a modifiable public blockchain in decentralized peer-to-peer networks. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed method of this study is the first to make the modification of transaction to be performed exactly same way as the approval of transaction in decentralized public networks. In particular, contributions of the proposed method are as follows.
• The proposed method provides transaction-level modification, and allows owners to choose the difficulty level of their transactions. For instance, some transactions can be assigned as unmodifiable by their owners.
• The proposed method efficiently manages the transaction modification process by using several sidechains.
• The proposed method uses one mainchain to record transactions in the blockchain and control the initiation and termination of sidechains.
• The proposed method uses several cryptographic techniques to prevent the modification of the transaction from being performed for malicious purposes.
• The proposed method does not use new types of cryptographic tools and has a similar structure to traditional public blockchains such as Bitcoin, and hence can be easily adaptable to the current public blockchain model.
• The proposed method complies to the key demands of the data protection regulations such as 'right to rectification', 'right to withdraw consent', and 'right to be forgotten', et cetera.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
This study is outlined as follows. In Section II we briefly review the theoretical background of blockchain.
In Section III we present the proposed method. In Section IV we test the validity of the proposed method through thought analysis. In Section V conclusions are specified.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we briefly review the background, assumptions and terminologies of blockchains by using jargons of Bitcoin [1] and PoW [26] . We also review related works that deal with the modifiability issues of blockchain technology.
A. BLOCKCHAIN OVERVIEW
We consider a blockchain network that appends a new block to the chain average every, say, 10 minutes (we call this fixed time duration 'round'). We denote the round by R [n] with the order index n (n = 0, 1, . . .), the block by B [n] , and the updated blockchain by BC [n] . This process can be described as follows: When the round R [n] starts, miners (nodes that try to find new blocks for rewards) begin to compute new blocks. Afterwards, the first miner who successfully compute a new block B [n] announces it to the blockchain network, and other nodes show their consensus on the announced block by updating their blockchain (which are all assumed to be equal to BC [n−1] ) to BC [n] by appending B [n] to BC [n−1] after checking its validity (For details, e.g., see [1] , [26] , [27] ):
where the notation '||' is the concatenation. In (1), we implicitly assumed that a new block can be computed in every round. This is not a mandatory assumption. To simplify the presentation, however, we shall use this assumption throughout the paper. Let us assume that the current round is R [n] , a miner collects transaction t [n] 1 , . . . , t [n] c [n] to record them in blockchain, and h [n−1] is the hash value of the block B [n−1] (the meaning of the hash value of the block will be explained later on). The mining (it refers the act of computing a new block for a reward) of block B [n] needs to find a nonce r of the following PoW:
Proof of Work: Given h [n−1] , t [n] , find a nonce r such that
where
In (2) we assume that H is the cryptographic hash function SHA-256 [28] , as in Bitcoin,
and Y X : set of 256-bits whose first |X | bits = X ,
where |X | is the length of X . Thus, Y 0 M is the set of 256-bits whose first M bits are all 0s. The hash value h [n] of the block B [n] is defined by
with the nonce r [n] that satisfies (2) . We now summarize required notations of this study in Table 1 . Figure 1 illustrates the chaining structure of the traditional blockchain model. We note that any single change in transactions t [n] 1 , . . . , t [n] c [n] demands a re-computation of r [n] in PoW (2) and hence affects h [n] of B [n] . This leads to a chain reaction to all r [ñ] and h [ñ] forñ > n. Thus, in traditional blockchain, it is practically impossible to modify any single transaction that is deep in the blockchain, without making traces. This property is called the immutability of blockchain.
B. RELATED WORKS
There have been several studies that analyzed the illicit use of public blockchains by storing history of child pornography, abusive conversion, illegal transaction on public blockchain database [2] , [16] , [19] , [20] , [22] , [29] , [30] . In addition, it is also found that the peer was well-aware about the fraudulent transaction but could not do much due to the immutability of public blockchain. Hence, several studies have investigated aforesaid issues and found modifiable blockchain as a key solution. Some permissioned or private blockchains have been developed for modifiable blockchain. For instance, in some permissioned blockchain meant for financial applications, the right to read transactions is given to the serving banks and to the central bank (or financial supervisory service committee alternatively), and the right to write, modify, and verify transactions are given only to the serving banks [31] . The private or permissioned blockchain model can have the modifiability of the blockchain by allowing small group of trusted nodes to modify data in blockchains [29] .
Attempts to have more decentralized approaches on modifiable blockchain can be found in [32] - [38] . In their works, the blockchain that can be modified is said to be 'rewritable', 'editable', 'redactable', 'modifiable' or 'mutable'. Even though referred terms are different, they have the same goal; the modification of data in blockchain.
Ateniese et al. [32] proposed the 'rewritable' blockchain with the use of chameleon hash functions in linking consecutive blocks in the chain. To be specific, when a block is requested to be modified, their method can efficiently compute, by using the chameleon trapdoor key, a collision, which keeps the state of the blockchain consistent after the modification. Their method is not extendable to public blockchain, as their technique of secret sharing the chameleon trapdoor key runs on a multiparty computation protocol. Here it is worth to note that Accenture's patents [39] , [40] are based on the work of Ateniese et al. [32] .
Derler et al. [33] extended the method of [32] to make the modification to be performed in the transaction level, instead of the block level. It is clear that their method is not extendable to public blockchain, either, since it also depends on the use of the chameleon hash function.
Puddu et al. [34] proposed a 'mutable' blockchain at which the modification can be performed without a hard forking. The study used fiat beside meta transaction to control unauthorized modifications. Finally, the study provided a modifiable collaborative decision making scheme as a use case.
Deuber et al. [35] also proposed a novel mechanism for 'redactable' blockchains. In their method, an edit operation can be proposed by a user followed by voting in the blockchain network through a consensus. In other words, an edit is only performed if it is approved by the blockchain policy and obtains enough votes. The old state of the block needs to be kept available for validation purpose. Like Ateniese et al. [32] , Deuber et al. [35] exclusively proposed to modify the blockchain in the block level.
Cheng et al. [36] proposed a controlled modification strategy based on the difficulty of computing by the Lagrange interpolation method with different abscissas repeatedly. Their study brought 'order field' to track 'mutable' and immutable block to reduce the modification cost.
Rajasekhar et al. [37] implemented a 'redactable' private blockchain by using the chameleon hashing. Their study used a public hash key and a secret trapdoor key in chameleon hash VOLUME 7, 2019 function for collision detection. Their study is also limited for private (permissioned) blockchain.
Florian et al. [38] proposed a functionality-preserving local erasure (FPLE) approach which is capable of erasing data from the local node. The study demonstrated the deletion of local data through a Bitcoin implementation by empowering node operators (private blockchain). However, the FPLE system is also incapable of erasing permissionless blockchain.
III. PROPOSED METHOD A. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED METHOD
The purpose of the proposed modifiable blockchain architecture is to modify transactions in blockchain upon proper requests. The overall process of the proposed method is outlined as follows:
• Classification of transaction: Owners choose the modification difficulty level for their transaction before they submit the transaction to the peer-to-peer network for the transaction-approval.
• Multichain structure: The proposed method uses a single mainchain for transaction-approval and multiple sidechains for transaction-modification.
• Transaction-approval in the mainchain: Each miner in the mainchain network collects transactions to form a block, and computes the hash value of the block.
In the computation of the block hash value, the miner uses target values of transactions, instead of transactions themselves. Once a new valid block is announced to the mainchain network, the new block is connected to the mainchain.
• Control of sidechains by the mainchain: The tail-bits of the block hash values in the mainchain determines which sidechain to be terminated (it means the connection of the sidechain to the mainchain) and at the same time to be initiated at each round ( Figure 2 ).
• Transaction-modifications in sidechains: Depending on the modification-difficulty level, owners of transactions can submit the modification request to a sidechain network. The choice of sidechain is determined by the modification difficulty level of the modification requested transaction. Miners in the sidechain try to solve a hash puzzle to get the right to modify the modification requested transaction. The miner who the modification right makes a set of modification commands as a block and connect the block to the sidechain.
• Execution of modifications: When sidechains are connected to the mainchain, modification requested transactions in the mainchain are modified according to blocks of modification commands in sidechains.
B. CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSACTION
In the proposed method, owners choose the modification difficulty level for their transaction before they submit the transaction to the peer-to-peer network for the transactionapproval. To be specific, owners of the transaction t [n]
i FIGURE 2. Mainchain-sidechain architecture. determine parameters in Table 2 to properly response a future modification request. Table 2 shows a list of information in transaction t [n] i . The notation e [n] i represents the modification difficulty of t [n] i . It is possible to make the number of difficulty levels as many as desired. In this paper, as an example, we will have four levels in the modification difficulty; one, represented by e [n] i = 00, for no possibility of modification, and the other three, represented by e [n] i = 01, 10, and 11, for three different modification difficulty levels (more detailed explanation will be given shortly after). The notation f [n] i represents the status of the transaction t [n] i . For instance, f [n] i = 0('approved') means that the transaction t [n] i is not modified once recorded in the mainchain, and f [n] i = 1('modified') means that the transaction t [n] i had been modified. The notation MB [n] i is used to represent the ownership of t [n] i . In other words, MB [n] i describes who have the right to legally request the modifica-
i represents an auxiliary data required for PoW of transaction-modification on t [n] i . At the moment when the transaction t [n] i is written in the mainchain for the first time, m [n] i is set to be null (i.e., the empty bit). It is obvious that t [n] i must include some other information, to identify which
In this paper, we omit such details, for the simplicity of presentation.
As mentioned earlier, blocks in the mainchain are for transaction-approval. The work to be done in the mainchain round R [n] is almost identical to that in Section II. The difference is brought by the demand that some transactions needed to be modifiable in the proposed method, while transactions in Bitcoin are not. For this purpose, the proposed method imposes a following 'Target Selection' rule to each miner in the mainchain network:
Target Selection:
for a modifiable transaction t [n] i , and
for an unmodifiable transaction t [n] i . Here parameters K , = 1, 2, 3 satisfy 1 < K 1 < K 2 < K 3 < 256 and determine the modification difficulty levels of t [n] i . The difficulty level parameter e [n] i is set by following
The notation c [n] represents the number of transactions to be included in block B [n] ,m [n] i is an auxiliary data required for PoW on transaction-modification. In the transaction-approval round R [n] , allm [n] i , i = 1, . . . , c [n] are set to be null (the empty bit). We, however, includem [n] i , to use (7) as the target selection and the validity verification of it simultaneously. Finally, in (7) , H K denotes a truncated version of the cryptographic hash function H , SHA-256:
Here we note that for any bits x,
and each t [n] i has four possible scenarios, modifiable with three different difficulty levels determined by K 1 , K 2 , K 3 and unmodifiable (the case when w [n] i = t [n] i ). In this paper, we assume that the proposed method restricts owners of transaction to assign their transactions to be unmodifiable if and only if those transactions are records of financial asset transfer.
C. TRANSACTION-APPROVAL IN MAINCHAIN
In each round R [n] in the mainchain, except the round for the genesis block B [0] , miners collect transaction to be approved. Each miner, however, may collect different transactions, and hence he or she may have different
and We will use these modification difficulty levels and target values for the verification of transaction-modification. For future usage, let
and
After finishing Target Selection (7) and (8), a miner challenges a following PoW:
Proof of Work (Transaction-Approval): Given h [n−1] , e [n] and w [n] , find a nonce r such that
In the proposed method, the hash value h [n] of the B [n] is defined by
where r [n] is a nonce satisfying (16 Figure 3 illustrates the chaining structure of the proposed blockchain model. Figure 3 shows that the proposed method provides an opportunity to modify transactions by making truncated hash values of modified versions equal to their original target values.
It is obvious that difficulty levels e [ = DS(H (e [n] ||w [n] )).
As for the digital signature DS we can use the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) using 'secp256k1' curve as in Bitcoin [41] , [42] . To make it possible to verify the digital signature S [n] , the miner needs to include the public key, paired to the private key used in (18), in the block B [n] . (18) , and miner's public key pk for the integrity verification of difficulty levels and target values.
As mentioned earlier, transactions t [n] i , i = 1, . . . , c [n] are recorded as in Table 2 . When the transaction-approval block is created, all status field f [n] i are set to be 0 ('approved') and allm [n] i , i = 1, . . . , c [n] , are null. The comparison between (2), (6) and (16), (17) shows how the proposed blockchain model is different from the traditional blockchain model, for example, Bitcoin: The hash value h [n] of the traditional blockchain block directly depends on all transactions t [n] i , i = 1, . . . , c [n] , while the hash value h [n] in the proposed blockchain block depends on difficulty level e [n] i , i = 1, . . . , c [n] and target values w [n] i , i = 1, . . . , c [n] . It turns out that this gives a room for transaction-modification.
D. TERMINATION AND INITIATION OF SIDECHAIN SEGMENTS
We use the term 'S -sidechain network' to call the peer-topeer network which the modification request for the transaction with the difficulty level K (see (10) ) is to be submitted to and necessary work for the transaction-modification to be prepared in. We also use the term 'S -sidechain', denoted by S , to indicate a blockchain where the block formed by step-by-step modification commands for a transaction in the mainchain is to be written by miners in the S -sidechain network.
The proposed method uses tail bits of block hash values h [n] of the mainchain to terminate the current sidechain 'segment' and at the same time to initiate the new sidechain segment. To explain this, let us consider an example which uses '3 tail bits' of h [n] , to be denoted by tail(h [n] ). Let
be disjoint sets of increasing subsequence in N (the set of all natural numbers) such that
Then the 3 tail bits of the block hash value h [n] in the mainchain controls sidechains by the following rule (this rule is set only for the explanatory purpose):
1 . (21) When n = i 0 , n =ñ 0 , or n =n 0 , only initiations of sidechain segments occur. Figure 2 illustrates the mainchain-sidechains architecture. To explain how the sidechain segment (e.g., S [n i ] 3 ) is connected to the mainchain, let us assume that h [n 0 ] be the first block hash value whose tail(h [n 0 ] ) = 000. Then miners in the S 3 -sidechain network start to do block mining for transaction-modification (the meaning of this statement will be explained in the next subsection) with B [n 0 ] as the genesis block of S [n 0 ] 3 until the next block hash value h [n 1 ] whose tail(h [n 1 ] ) = 000 is announced in the mainchain. Let
be blocks mined in the S 3 -sidechain network during the time interval that h [n 0 ] to h will be connected to the mainchain when the next block hash value h [n 2 ] whose tail(h [n 2 ] ) = 000 is announced in the mainchain.
By extending the same argument, we can define the i-th S 3 -sidechain segment by
For the block hash value of b
, we shall use the following notation:
Notice that
Again, by extending the same argument, we can define
, to denote the i-th sidechain segment, the j-th block in the i-th sidechain segment, and the block hash value of the j-th block in the i-th sidechain segment, respectively, for S 2 -and S 1 -sidechains.
Before we close this subsection, it is worth to mention that the rule (21) implies that S 3 -, S 2 -and S 1 -sidechains will be connected to the next block in the mainchain with the probability 1 8 , 2 8 , and 3 8 , respectively. This claim is easily verifiable by high randomness of hash values.
The proposed method uses S 2 -and S 3 -sidechains to modify single transaction per block. The difference between S 2 -and S 3 -sidechains is generated by the rule that the S 3 -sidechain will be used for transactions to be modified with more computational efforts (because of their importance).
To explain how the block b
(for definitions, see (24) and (25) u , see Table 2 ) to p [n * ] u . Here we implicitly assume that only the content of the transaction can be modifiable and n * is smaller than n i to make sure that only transactions already in the mainchain can be requested for modification.
Let Alice be a miner (in the S 3 -sidechain network) who selects the request of t [n * ] u -modification. Then she tries to find a nonce of following PoW:
Proof of Work (Single-Transaction-Modification): Given
Here w [n * ] u is the target value of the modification-requested transaction t [n * ] u (see (7)). At this moment, other miners in the S 3 -sidechain network also try to find nonces of their PoW (28) associated with their choices of modification-requested transactions.
It is now clear why the parameter K in (7) and (10) . Then, since . See (7) and (17) . As the miner who first finds the hash value
Alice now announces her transaction-modification block b
that has data in Table 4 . Table 4 shows what information should be in the block b . The block also needs to have the digital signature (S TMC ) by Alice (as being a creator of TMC) on TMC for the integrity of TMC, and the public key (paired to the private key used in the digital signature), denoted by pk * , to make it possible to verify the digital signature by any nodes. Finally, the block b in t [n * ] u . We shall use this hash value to prevent 'double modifications'. We shall discuss this problem in Section IV.
TMC has following step-by-step commands: 
Let us assume that at the moment when the next block hash value h [n i+1 ] whose tail(h [n i+1 ] ) = 000 is computed in the mainchain, the computation of the block b [n i ,N i ] 3 just has been completed in the S 3 -sidechain network. Then the miner who computes the block B [n i+1 ] (notice that its block hash value is
||h [n i+1 ] as the hash value of the block B [n i+1 ] to the mainchain network, i.e.,
Here we note that tail(h [n i+1 ] ) = 000 still holds with the concatenated hash value h [n i+1 ] . The concatenation of two hash values to form a new block hash value of B [n i+1 ] (i ≥ 0) in (32) makes the block mining after B [n i+1 ] in the mainchain to be dependent not only on h [n i ,N i ] 3 , but also on h [n i ,j] 3 , 1 ≤ j < N i . This means that any nodes who accept B [n i+1 ] must accept all blocks in the sidechain segment S [n i ] 3 and the transaction-modifications to be performed by S [n i ] 3 . The proposed method must be implemented to make that the act of appending the block B [n i+1 ] (i ≥ 0) to the mainchain leads to the execution of transaction-modification-command in blocks in the sidechain segment S [n i ] 3 (24) .
Miners of blocks b
[n i ,j] 3 will get block rewards from the S 3 -sidechain network, and possibly from the parties who requested transaction-modifications, while miners of B [n i ] (i ≥ 1) will get not only block rewards from the mainchain network but also 'connection rewards' from the S 3sidechain network.
Recall that how the subsequence {ñ 0 ,ñ 1 ,ñ 2 , . . .} is defined and is related to the S 2 -sidechain (see (19) and (20) in (28)). This requirement is imposed to prevent the head start in computing transaction-modification block, which might lead to malicious modification. The fact that only one transaction can be modified in one block mining is not desirable in many aspects. Examples of them include high price and inefficiency of transaction modification.
Some transactions, however, are concerned only by their owners, and hence modifications of them only matters to owners themselves. Such examples can be found in many non-financial transactions. The proposed method suggests that those type of transactions are to be assigned with K 1 and the difficulty level parameter (e [n] i in (9)) is to be 01 in the target selection (7) . The proposed method also suggests that owners themselves prepare transaction-modificationcommands. To make the latter suggestion meaningful, the proposed method uses a following form of PoW, instead of (28), to response the request of t [n * ] u -modification:
Here we assume that the content m [n * ] u of the transaction t [n * ] u is requested to be modified to p [n * ] u and the difficulty level of t [n * ] u is associated with K 1 (see (7) ). To make (33) solvable by owners, the parameter K 1 must be not too large, for example, K 1 should be much smaller than M . Letr be the nonce satisfying (33) andh be the corresponding hash valueh
Then, since u is replaced withr. See (7) and (17) .
In the proposed method, modification command sets for transactions associated with K 1 will be treated as a transaction. To be specific, owners of t [n * ] u set up the transactiont that contains step-by-step commands to modify t [n * ] u in B [n * ] . Table 5 shows a part of data in the transactiont.
Just like Table 4 , Table 5 shows what information should be in the transactiont. The location information (n * , u) of the modification requested transaction t [n * ] u in the mainchain, a list of commands (TMC * ) to perform the modification of 
Step 1 of TMC * , nodes in the S 1 sidechain network check the validity of the modification request on t [n * ] u . To make it possible, TMC * must include the digital signature on the modification-request by owners. Same points checked in Step 1 of TMC also need to be checked in Step 1 of TMC * . Now creators of the transactiont submitt to the S 1 -sidechain network for the approval. The mainchain controls the termination and the initiation of S 1 -sidechain segments exactly same way as it does for S 2 -and S 3 -sidechain networks. Miners in the S 1 -sidechain network collect transactions formed by modification commands (e.g.,t) to make a block and then append it to a S 1 -sidechain segment by solving the traditional PoW (2) . Notice that one block in the S 1 -sidechain can modify multiple transactions, while one block in the S 2 -of S 3 -sidechains can modify just one transaction. Notice also that the actual transaction modifications by blocks in the S 1 -sidechain segment are performed when the the S 1 -sidechain segment is connected to the mainchain.
IV. DISCUSSION

A. THREAT ANALYSIS
This subsection discusses several protection measures the method takes in an adverse situation. We will skip the threat analysis for the transaction-approval. The transactionapproval of the proposed blockchain model is identical to that of the traditional blockchain model such as Bitcoin in structure, and hence at least in the transaction-approval the proposed method is as much secure as Bitcoin (it does not have shown any serious weak points yet). This claim holds for the transaction-approval not only in the mainchain, but also in the S 1 -sidechain.
For explanation purpose, we assume that there is a transaction t [n * ] u in the B [n * ] of the mainchain, and sidechain segments Sn k 1 , Sñ j 2 , S n i 3 (for definitions of notations, see (19) ) are being mined in S 1 -S 2 -and S 3 -sidechain networks, respectively, right now. We also assume that Eve is a malicious user in the blockchain network.
1) FORGERY OF A VALID PROOF FOR MODIFICATION REQUEST
The digital signature by owners protects the valid proof for the modification request. Thus, as long as owners keep their private keys securely, the forgery of the valid proof is impossible.
2) HEAD START BLOCK MINING
The block mining in the proposed method, whether it is for transaction-approval (in the mainchain or the S 1 -sidechain) or for transaction-modification (in S 2 -or S 3 -sidechains), needs the hash value of the immediately preceding block. Therefore the mining of the next block is useless, in the case when the hash value of the current block is not computed yet. Here we note that the PoW (33) is not a block mining; the computation is to be performed by owners for their own sake, and hence no block reward will be given.
3) MALICIOUS TRANSACTION-MODIFICATION WITHOUT A VALID REQUEST
Both TMC (transaction-modification-command) in S 2 -or S 3 -sidechains and TMC * in S 1 -sidechain must have valid proofs for their modification requests and those valid proofs need digital signatures by owners of the modification requested transaction. Therefore, as long as owners keep their private keys securely, the proposed method is secure against the attack by the malicious transaction-modification without a valid request.
4) MALICIOUS TRANSACTION-MODIFICATION WITH A VALID REQUEST
Suppose Eve tried to maliciously modify t [n * ] u with a valid request. This scenario itself indicates that either Eve stole private keys of owners' of t [n * ] u or conspired with all or part of owners. At any cases, it was owners' fault. In blockchain, giving one's private key to someone is same as giving the ownership of transaction (associated with that private key) to that someone. The proposed blockchain method of this paper has no different principle.
The proposed method, however, provide several safety measures to owners of the transaction. Recall that the proposed method restricts owners to assign transactions of cryptocurrency transfer to be classified as unmodifiable. Thus, owners are not to be harmed at least by financial loss in the proposed method. Another safety measure is that even if the transaction is modified against owners' interests because of their faults, owners still have a chance to correct that modification by requesting the deletion of that transaction and the approval of a new corrected transaction (associated with new private keys) to the blockchain network.
5) SEEKING AN UNFAIR REWARD WITH FORGED TARGET VALUES
Suppose Eve tried to get an unfair reward by mining the transaction-modification block on t [n * ] u of the block B [n * ] in S 2 -or S 3 -sidechains (here we note that there is no reward for the transaction-modification in the S 1 -sidechain network) with a forged target value. This attack can be considered as a threat (for the time being) only if Eve was the miner of the block B [n * ] (and hence she could forge the target value w [n * ] u as she likes, with a corresponding digital signature) and she was the owner of t [n * ] u or could stole owners' private keys (and hence she could provide a valid proof of the modification request). In this scenario, Eve could immediately announce her block with any r as a nonce and the changed target valuew [ 
B. FUTURE WORK
The future study plans to include followings along with necessary empirical evaluation of the proposed blockchain architecture.
• The study plans to consider a multipurpose hierarchical blockchains. Based on usability, individual childchain can be operated under the guidance of the mainchain.
• The study plans to consider time-limited modifiable transactions of financial asset transfer.
• The prioritization of difficulty level of the transaction modification according to its significance will be considered in the future version of the study.
• For a coherent representation, the study followed the bitcoin and associated consensus algorithm (PoW). As the method is compatible enough, so incorporation with the other major blockchain platform would not be an issue.
In future, the study plans to accommodate modification method for the key blockchain platforms.
• The study only covers the technical aspects deals with modifiable blockchain. In future study, the work plans to answer following questions: how the ownership of transaction is determined, up to what extension the transaction can be modified, or what should be a block reward for transaction-modification block mining and who should pay for, et cetera.
V. CONCLUSION
In this study we propose a method of building blockchains in which transactions can be approved and modified by collective contribution of decentralized peer-to-peer network nodes. The proposed blockchain method uses PoW similar to that in Bitcoin for the transaction-approval. The transactionapproval PoW of the proposed method, however, depends on truncated hash values of transaction contents, instead of transactions themselves. This makes it possible to modify transactions if proper modification request and collective contribution of decentralized peer-to-peer network nodes are given.
The proposed method uses a hierarchical multi-blockchain model, as a tool to modify transactions more efficiently in decentralized networks. The proposed method allows the block mining process of each sidechain to proceed almost independently not only from that of the mainchain but also from those of other sidechains. Depending upon the block length and peer properties, the modifiability scope and its efficiency might vary.
The proposed method uses the permissionless blockchain model not only for the transaction-approval but also for the transaction-modification. As compared with permissioned model based methods, by not having any kinds of central or semi-central authorities, the proposed method can get general consensus more easily on the transaction-modification in a trustless environment.
The proposed method provides right to be modifiable to blockchains, without sacrificing any of core benefits of the blockchain technology, such as greater transparency, enhanced security, and improved traceability, et cetera. We expect that the added flexibility makes the blockchain technology more competent and effective for various services.
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